The work of creating the future is being done now ─ and much of it is unsustainable in terms of natural and cultural resources. How will the next generation of leadership for environmental sustainability be raised up? Can we imagine sustainable futures, and can we enable transformative leadership to help us realize them? How can we best ensure that the several generations share their particular knowledge? What are the ethical frameworks, methodologies, curricula, and tools necessary for advancing and strengthening education (...) for intergenerational sustainability learning and leadership? In this book, 82 authors from 26 countries across 6 continents seek answers in 32 essays to the many questions related to the intergenerational collaboration that holds promise for creating sustainable futures. The authors themselves represent a diversity of geography, gender, and generation ─ and include the institutions comprising the emerging International Intergenerational Net-work of Centers. They speak to key principles, perspectives, and praxes at the intersection of intergenerational learning and transformative leadership in the context of education for sustainability. A visionary tour de force, this book explores the challenges and complexities of future learning models beyond the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development. It provides a timely discourse encompassing intergenerational and cultural dimensions, including ethics. Contributors articulate a deeper understanding of leadership in the post-Enlightenment era. Chapters in the book offer examples cutting across a diverse range of experiences worldwide, making this volume not only refreshing for practitioners, but also invaluable to policy-makers. ─ Dzulkifli Abdul Razak President, International Association of Universities Former Vice-Chancellor, Universiti Sains Malaysia These are critical times for the global community. Big issues are on the table: security, climate change, environmental destabilization, disease, hunger, and others. Actions we take today must embrace lessons from the past, present realities, and the rights and interests of future generations. Indeed, intergenerational learning is vital to education for sustainable development. This book makes a very timely and urgent call, challenging our traditional learning approaches and inviting us to dig deeper, stretch our minds wider, and see farther. ─ Akpezi Ogbuigwe Former Head of Environmental Education and Training, United Nations Environment Programme Executive Chairperson, Anpez Center for Environment and Development, Port Harcourt, Nigeria Achieving sustainable development requires generations, young and old, to engage with and learn from each other, and for leadership to embrace change. That is one of the key messages of this remarkable book. I wish I had this book when I took up the leadership role of my university two decades ago. I wish I could have given this book to my sons as they started their university education. ─ Goolam Mohamedbhai Former Secretary-General, Association of African Universities Honorary President, International Association of Universities. (shrink)

A search for consensus about the methodology of discovery among physicians and physiologists led the author to identify a crucial anomaly of medical historiography: in general, physicians stress the significance of clinicopathologic method, while physiologists emphasize the experimental. Hence, physicians and bench scientists might be perceived as members of epistemically distinct research traditions. However, analysis of the historical development of discoveries in medicine, exemplified by case studies in physiology, bacteriology, immunology, and therapeutics, reveals that the epistemic dichotomy is illusory. Both (...) physicians and bench scientists discover in the same way: by identifying and explaining clinical anomalies. It is argued that the sociological role of experimentation is to dramatize clinical hypotheses and not test them in a Popperian sense. Keywords: accident, anomaly, continuity, experiment, logic of discovery, psycholinguistic realm CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

For three hundred years, Bernard Mandeville was considered the first great apologist for luxury and the unsavory dimensions of commercial society, a reputation that remains largely intact even as scholars reconsider the depth and influence of his thought. Here, I argue that Mandeville’s attitude toward luxury and material excess is far more ambivalent—indeed, highly critical—than previously thought. As societies became wealthier and more literate, Mandeville saw both individuals and societies growing increasingly susceptible to discontent—to “grumbling,” as the original title of (...) The Fable of the Bees has it. This focus on grumbling is particularly worthy of close study because Mandeville’s chief profession was medicine, and, more specifically, the treatment of hypochondria. Identifying the bourgeois lifestyle as the cause of hypochondria in both the body and the body politic led him to caution his patients against the very things with which his name is synonymous: luxury and excess. (shrink)

Abela accepts Fine’s account of realism and instrumentalism, but thinks that we can reject the Natural Ontological Attitude by distinguishing the theoretical attempt to make sense of scientific practice from choosing the attitude we bring to the debate, or to science itself. But Abela’s attitudes are vulnerable to Fine’s criticisms of the philosophical positions. However, if we take attitude as contrastive and as full‐blooded enough to lead to different behaviour we can see a gap in Fine’s position. He cannot tell (...) us why it is science that he trusts. When we look more widely, the philosophical positions might be seen as ways of justifying that trust. (shrink)

Michael Williams has frequently considered and rejected approaches to "our knowledge of the external world" that see it as the best explanation for certain features of experience. This paper examines the salience of his position to approaches such as Mackie’s that do not deny the presentational directness of ordinary experience but do permit a gap between how things appear and how they are that allows for sceptical doubts. Williams’ main argument is that, to do justice to its place in a (...) foundationalist strategy, the external world as hypothesis must offer an explicandum that does not invoke concepts of objects but is rather purely experiential. He next claims that no coherent regularities are available at such a level so there is nothing to be explained. Coherence only comes with objects, not as something objects could explain. Confronting this with Mackie’s Lockean theory of perception, we find that Mackie decisively rejects the first claim about the nature of the explicandum, since he sees ordinary perception as involving intentional objects which are distinct from the persisting objects they present. He is also committed to rejecting Williams’ line on purely experiential regularities, though this plays a subordinate role in his general position. The crucial issue then becomes the tenability of Mackie’s intentional object analysis and the extent to which it might yet tilt the argument in favour of realism against a global sceptic. In formulating his own epistemological strategies Williams might appear to countenance a version of Mackie’s view divorced from foundationalism. But while Williams’ contextualism in its minimal version might do so, in practice it retains the lessons derived from his skirmishes with scepticism and thus disallows certain types of enquiry. I conclude by contrasting Mackie’s response to scepticism with that of Williams in his diagnostic vein. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1987, examines the notion of truth and then discusses knowledge and the way in which much of our knowledge revises or rejects the common-sense we start from. The author argues that our knowledge is not as secure as some would like to think and that there are important limits to the possibility for explanation. He shows how values permeate our ordinary thinking and argues against the objectivity of these values, showing the practical consequences of this (...) argument for teaching in schools. This stimulating approach to a fundamental educational issue does not require previous experience of formal philosophy and will be useful to both education students and teachers in schools. (shrink)

Collingwood's... descendants... will be engaged in conceptual analysis not unlike other modern forms of conceptual analysis but not so isolated, in principle and in practice, from the panorama of the human past, from the rich diversity of contemporary cultures, and from the perplexities of individual experience in art, religion, the privacies of thought, and the publicity of action. They will search out the a priori elements in experience and the empirical genesis of thought. They may try, although they will surely (...) fail, to make the scope of philosophy as wide as life itself, and this attempt would at least be not unwelcome in a time when some of the descendants of Socrates try, although they too will fail, to make the scope of philosophy as narrow as an academic department. Louis O. Mink. (shrink)

Informal logicians recognise the frequent use of unstated assumptions; some (e.g. Fisher) also recognise entertained arguments and recommend a suppositional approach (such as Mackie's) to conditional statements. It is here argued that these two be put together to make argument diagrams more accurate and subtle. Philosophical benefits also accrue: insights into Jackson's apparent violations of modus tollens and contraposition and McGee's counterexamples to the validity of modus ponens.

J. Gingell, E. P. Brandon; Popular Culture, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 3, 7 March 2003, Pages 461–485, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-97.

Defenders of high culture can be found invoking many and various allies. Many are, we think, out of place. These defences raise issues that we do not need to worry about or themselves create unnecessary difficulties for clarity of thought on these matters. In this chapter we will touch upon a number of such irrelevancies. We will begin by examining the assimilation of high culture to religion and religious concerns in the thought of Eliot and Scruton: this will allow us (...) to indicate our stance on the place of religion in schools. We will then examine some psychological and sociological issues that Bantock has invoked in defending his secular vision of the role of culture, and conclude with Barrow's curious identification of culture with general intelligence. (shrink)

Bernard Mandeville construiu sua obra-prima de dois volumes, A fábula das abelhas, em torno de um poema largamente ignorado originalmente publicado em 1705, sua "A colmeia resmungona". Esse poema tenta proporcionar o contexto literário para a escolha feita por Mandeville da metáfora apiana. Examinamos exemplos antigos e modernos de teoria social e política informados e articulados por referência à organização e estrutura dos apiários e seus habitantes. A consideração desse contexto, conforme argumentamos, demonstra de uma nova maneira o caráter subversivo (...) de “A colmeia resmungona” e suas iterações subsequentes como A fábula das abelhas. Mandeville vira do avesso as suposições desgastadas pelo tempo sobre a harmonia natural das colmeias, sua relação com a sociedade humana, e o papel da fala e da razão em seu florescimento. (shrink)

In the course of this book we shall frequently appeal to what we call an Arnoldian filter, a principle we wish to urge for choosing much of what should form part of education in schools. This priniciple is based on a remark in Matthew Arnold's Preface to Culture and Anarchy,1 that culture is a matter of getting ‘to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (1935, p.6, emphasis (...) added). Arnold's work here and elsewhere is often seen as a key monument in English humanist thought. Trilling claims that ‘he established criticism as an intellectual discipline among the people of two nations and set its best tone’ (1949, p.3). It may not be of merely historical interest to consider some of the concerns that drove Arnold to offer culture in his sense as a contribution to contemporary and future society. (shrink)

This chapter deals with a crucial component of our position, the presumption that there are objective grounds for preferring one thing to another within the various cultural institutions we deal with, that there are better or worse symphonies, soufflés and theories of the atom. The task of showing this is more urgent for some institutions than others. While philosophers can doubt anything, most people are persuaded of the objectivity of our efforts to comprehend the physical world and to weigh, count (...) and measure accurately in many areas of human activity. Again, when we are faced with a choice among functional objects or processes, most people will admit that we can ground a preference for a knife or an exercise routine on objectively established facts: sharpness, or measurable increase in strength. Here, certainly, various conflicting desiderata may enter and make actual decisions more difficult — the sharpest knife may also be the most expensive; we may need to worry about its safety features; it may be ugly; and so on. But many will doubt that our judgements of comparative worth for non-functional objects such as paintings or sonatas can claim a similarly objective basis. We shall, therefore, concentrate our efforts on the most doubted areas, but will begin with the less contentious, where we think it is useful to draw attention to the genuine problems some philosophers have stressed, to show in fact that what we believe to be popular unconcern deserves to be somewhat ruffled. (shrink)

The fact that education is, and must be, a process of enculturation for those being educated gives us some, but by no means enough, guidance as to what we would expect to see going on in our schools. For given that our educational institutions are part of our culture and, given that anything that is part of our culture will transmit cultural messages, if we put children in school and let them play all day, or simply asked teachers to explain (...) their hobbies to the children, then some processes of enculturalisation would be going on. But no one with any real concern for either our children or their education would think such things fulfil a proper role for schools. Certainly if, as Arnold thought, education is a question of passing on, or trying to pass on, the features from our culture that we value, then any such reliance on random processes must be ruled out. Instead we have to select those aspects of our culture which we wish our children to partake of and insist that our educational establishments make sustained and intentional efforts to ensure such participation. (shrink)

Arnold wrote in an educational tradition that both lay in a main line of descent from the cultural formations he most valued and equipped him with the tools necessary to appreciate many of the elements in those traditions that are not in his native language. So when he referred, as exemplars of high culture, to Homer and Cicero, Montesquieu and Goethe, he presumed acquaintance with their works in the original languages on his own part and on that of his audience. (...) His own vernacular derived from that of Shakespeare and the Authorised Version of the Bible. (shrink)